Miles E. Locker, CSB #103510 DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT 2 Department of Industrial Relations State of California 455 Golden Gate Avenue, 9th Floor San Francisco, California 94102 Telephone: (415) 703-4863 (415) 703-4806 Attorney for State Labor Commissioner 5 б 7 BEFORE THE LABOR COMMISSIONER 8

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FANNY GAMBLE, as guardian ad litem for) No. TAC 40-03 MICHELLE GAMBLE, a minor,

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Petitioner,

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SOMA MANAGEMENT, LLC,

DETERMINATION OF CONTROVERSY

Respondent.

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The above-captioned matter, a petition to determine controversy under Labor Code \$1700.44, came on regularly for hearing on April 1, 2004, in San Francisco, California, before the Labor Commissioner's undersigned hearing officer. Petitioner appeared in propria persona; Kim Chew appeared on behalf of the Respondent. Based on the evidence presented at this hearing and on the other papers on file in this mater, the Labor Commissioner hereby adopts the following decision.

FINDINGS OF FACT

SOMA MANAGEMENT, LLC (hereinafter "SOMA") has been licensed as a talent agency by the State Labor Commissioner,

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pursuant to Labor Code section 1700.5, at all times relevant herein.

- In 2002, Fanny Gamble brought her daughter, Michelle Gamble (hereinafter "Petitioner") to SOMA's office to discuss whether SOMA could obtain modeling work for Michelle. Walterscheid, SOMA's director, advised Ms. Gamble that in order to get modeling work, it would be necessary to schedule a photo shoot and print composites that could be shown to potential clients. Fanny Gamble informed Walterscheid that she did not have the funds to pay for the photo shoot and prints. Ms. Gamble testified that Karen Walterscheid told her that she would not have to pay for the photo shoot, and that she would only need to pay \$180 for the composite prints. SOMA disputes that, and asserts that Ms. Gamble was told that although SOMA would advance the funds for the photo shoot, and pay part of the total needed to print the composites, once Petitioner obtained modeling work she would have to reimburse SOMA for these advanced funds. As discussed below, it is unnecessary to resolve this particular factual dispute, as all other relevant fact are not in dispute, and we would make the same determination that we reach below without regard to whether Petitioner was told that she would have to reimburse SOMA for these funds.
- 3. EC Morgan, SOMA's president and CEO, took the photographs of Michelle Gamble that were later printed as composites. The photo shoot took place at SOMA's studio. The photos were printed by a separate photo printing business that is not related to SOMA, and Fanny Gamble paid \$180 directly to this separate business.

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- Almost nine months later, in January 2003, Karen Walterscheid telephoned Fanny Gamble to inform her that SOMA obtained a modeling job for Michelle, and that it would pay \$2,500 less SOMA's 20% commission. Ms. Gamble agreed to have Michelle take this job, and John Gamble, Petitioner's father, signed a written contract with SOMA on Petitioner's behalf, for a term of nine days, making SOMA the Petitioner's sole and exclusive agent in the fields of modeling and entertainment. contract, signed on January 15, 2003, entitles SOMA to commissions in the amount of 20% of petitioner's gross modeling earnings during the period from January 15 to January 24, 2003. The contract also provides that petitioner shall "reimburse [SOMA] for all out-of-pocket expenses which you incur from time to time on [petitioner's] behalf." Finally, the contract provides that "all income may be paid directly to [SOMA], and [SOMA] agree[s] to promptly pay the balance of such income to [petitioner] after deducting [the] commission and any out-ofpocket expenses which [SOMA] incur[s]on [petitioner's] behalf." The form of the contract, that is, its general substantive provisions, had been approved by the Labor Commissioner as part of the talent agency licensing process.
- 5. On or about January 20, 2003, Petitioner performed print modeling services for Sonic Solutions, on the job that had been obtained by SOMA. Based on Karen Walterscheid's representation that \$2,500 would be charged for this job, Fanny Gamble expected that SOMA would deduct \$500 for their commission, and that Michelle would receive \$2,000. Sonic Solutions was billed by SOMA in the amount of \$2,500. By check dated March 4, 2003,

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Sonic Solutions paid \$2,500 to SOMA for petitioner's modeling services.

In April 2003, SOMA mailed a check to the petitioner for her modeling services for Sonic Solutions. The check, dated March 15, 2003, was written in the amount of \$277. a cover letter that explained the basis for the deductions from the amount that petitioner was expecting to receive for her The cover letter failed to state that SOMA billed services. Sonic Solutions at the rate of \$2,500. Rather, according to this cover letter, the rate was \$2,000, from which SOMA deducted its 20% commission, resulting in \$1,600 earned by the petitioner. From this amount, according to the cover letter, SOMA deducted \$1,323 for "advanced charges," consisting of \$750 for the photo shoot, \$150 for the photo shop, \$300 for web hosting, and \$123 for mailing and messenger fees, leaving petitioner with the net payment of \$277.

7. Fanny Gamble sent a letter to SOMA, dated May 14, 2003, demanding payment of \$1,723, the difference between the \$2,000 of net modeling earnings that Michelle was supposed to have received (based on gross earnings of \$2,500 less SOMA's 20% commission), and the amount of the check that had been sent. According to this letter, and according to Ms. Gamble's testimony at this hearing, Ms. Gamble did not authorize any of the deductions that were made from petitioner's earnings, except for SOMA's 20% commission. According to a letter from Karen Walterscheid to Fanny Gamble, dated May 23, 2003, SOMA "advanced all charges for the photos, web hosting and marketing cost. . . . I made it very clear to you that if Michelle worked all charges are paid back to

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the agency first." By letter to Karen Walterscheid, dated May 24, 2003, Fanny Gamble disputed the existence of any agreement to re-pay any of the so-called advanced charges: "You didn't mention anything about me paying anything."

- 8. SOMA did not pay any additional money to petitioner. The next communication between the parties took place on July 25, 2003, following petitioner's unsuccessful attempt to deposit the \$277 check that SOMA had sent to petitioner more than three months earlier. The check was returned to petitioner by her bank without payment, due to insufficient funds in SOMA's account. In a letter to SOMA, John Gamble demanded payment. Shortly thereafter, SOMA issued a new, negotiable check for \$277.
- 9. Ms. Gamble filed this petition to determine controversy with the Labor Commissioner on November 7, 2003, seeking payment of the amounts that had been deducted by SOMA from petitioner's gross modeling earnings (except for amounts deducted for payment of SOMA's 20% commission). Around the same time, Ms. Gamble also filed a small claims court complaint against SOMA, concerning the same dispute and seeking the same remedy. There was a hearing in small claims court, and on January 21, 2004, the small claims court issued a judgment in favor of SOMA, awarding nothing to Ms. Gamble. (Gamble v. SOMA Management, LLC, Marin County Small Claims Court, Case No. 0311563.) At the outset of the Labor Commissioner hearing, SOMA's representative, Kim Chew, moved for dismissal of the petition to determine controversy on the ground that the dispute had already been heard, and resolved in SOMA's favor, by the Marin County Superior Court.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

Petitioner is an "artist" within the meaning of Labor Code section 1700.4(b). SOMA is a "talent agency" within the meaning of Labor Code section 1700.4(a). This dispute, concerning the alleged failure of a talent agency to disburse funds to an artist within thirty days of receipt, constitutes a controversy within the meaning of Labor Code §1700.44(c), and thus, is properly before the Labor Commissioner. (Labor Code §1700.25(c).)

At the outset, we must consider whether the judgment that has been issued by the small claims court is binding so as to preclude the Labor Commissioner from independently determining this controversy. We have already considered this question in Garcia v. Bonilla (TAC 04-02) and de Beky v. Bonilla (TAC 11-02). We see no reason to depart from the analysis set out in those determinations, wherein we noted the Labor Commissioner has exclusive primary jurisdiction to determine all controversies arising under the Talent Agencies Act. The Act specifies that "[i]n cases of controversy arising under this chapter, the parties involved shall refer the matters in dispute to the Labor Commissioner, who shall hear and determine the same, subject to an appeal to the superior court where the same shall be heard de novo.' (Labor Code §1700.44(a).) Courts cannot encroach upon the Labor Commissioner's exclusive original jurisdiction to hear matters, including defenses, arising under the Talent Agencies Act.

"The Commissioner has the authority to hear and determine various disputes, including the validity of artists' managerartist contracts and the liability of parties thereunder.

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([Buchwald v. Superior Court, supra, 254 Cal.App.2d 347,] 357.)

The reference of disputes involving the [A]ct to the Commissioner is mandatory. (Id. at p. 358.) Disputes must be heard by the Commissioner, and all remedies before the Commissioner must be exhausted before the parties can proceed to the superior court. (Ibid.)" (REO Broadcasting Consultants v. Martin (1999) 69

Cal.App.4th 489, 494-495, italics in original.)

Therefore, the Labor Commissioner, not the court, has "the exclusive right to decide in the first instance all the legal and factual issues" that arise in connection with a claim or defense based upon the Talent Agencies Act. Styne v. Stevens (2001) 26 Cal.4th 42, 56, fn. 6. There is no concurrent original jurisdiction: "[T]he plain meaning of section 1700.44, subdivision (a), and the relevant case law, negate any inference that courts share original jurisdiction with the Commissioner incontroversies arising under the Act. On the contrary, the Commissioner's original jurisdiction of such matters is exclusive." Styne v. Stevens, supra at 58. Here, as in the two Bonilla cases, the small claims court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by hearing and deciding a matter over which the Labor Commissioner has exclusive primary jurisdiction.

Here, as in the Bonilla cases, we are confronted by a final judgment that was issued by a court that lacked subject matter jurisdiction. For the same reasons that were extensively set forth in the Bonilla cases, we conclude that this small claims judgment was properly subject to collateral attack based on the small claims court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Witkin, 8 Cal. Proc. (4th), Attack on Judgment in Trial Court,

§6. A judgment "void on its face" may be collaterally attacked when the defect may be shown without going outside the record or judgment roll. Becker v. S.P.V. Const. Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 489, Alternatively, a judgment that is not void on its face may be collaterally attacked through extrinsic evidence as to which no objection was made when the evidence is offered. See Witkin, 8 Cal. Proc. (4th), Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, §13. Thus, whether we view the small claims judgment as void on its face, or we consider the extrinsic evidence as to which no objection was made showing that the dispute heard and decided by the small claims court was the exact same dispute as that presented to the Labor Commissioner through this petition to determine controversy, we are compelled to conclude that the small claims court judgment was void, as it was issued by a court that lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and that this void judgment is subject to collateral attack raised by this proceeding before Labor Commissioner.

Having found that this proceeding to determine controversy under the Talent Agencies Act is not barred by the judgment on the small claims proceeding, we now turn to the merits of the dispute. Labor Code section 1700.40(a) provides, in relevant part: "No talent agency shall collect a registration fee." The term "registration fee" is defined for purposes of the Talent Agencies Act at Labor Code section 1700.02(b) to include, any charge made, or attempted to be made, to an artist for registering or listing an applicant for employment in the entertainment industry, letter writing, photographs, film strips, video tapes, or other reproductions of the applicant, or any

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 activity of a like nature. The amounts that SOMA charged petitioner for the photo shoot (\$750), the photo shop (\$150), web hosting (\$300), and mailing and messenger fees (\$123), all fall within this definition of "registration fees," and thus, are all prohibited by Labor Code section 1700.40(a).

Thus, even assuming, for the sake of argument, that SOMA had informed petitioner of these fees and petitioner had agreed to them, any such agreement would be unenforceable and void as contrary to the express provisions of the Talent Agencies Act¹.

SOMA misplaces its reliance on language in its Labor

Commissioner approved talent agency agreement that requires an artist to "reimburse [SOMA] for all out-of-pocket expenses" incurred on the artist's behalf, and which allows SOMA to retain, from income received from a client on behalf of an artist, "any out-of-pocket expenses" which SOMA incurred on the artist's behalf. Under the Labor Code, there are certain types of expenses, that fall under the category of "registration fees," which an agency can never collect or attempt to collect from an artist. SOMA's talent agency agreement must therefore be read to allow SOMA to collect all out-of-pocket expenses incurred on the

^{&#}x27;The statute goes beyond prohibiting the collection of any "registration fee." Labor Code §1700.40(b) makes it unlawful for a talent agency to refer an artist to any person, firm or corporation in which the talent agency had a direct or indirect financial interest for other services to be rendered to the artist, including photography, audition tapes, demonstration reels or similar materials, business management, personal management, coaching, acting classes, casting or talent brochures, agency-client directories, or other printing. Labor Code §1700.40(c) prohibits a talent agency from collecting referral fees from any person, firm or corporation providing any of these sorts of services to an artist under contract with the talent agency.

artist's behalf except for those as to which it is unlawful, under the Labor Code, for an agency to collect or attempt to collect from an artist. In other words, the talent agency agreement cannot be construed to override the statutory prohibition against collecting any "registration fee."

We therefore conclude that petitioner is entitled to payment of the \$1,723, the amount that SOMA has unlawfully retained from the \$2,500 that it received from Sonic Solutions. SOMA was entitled to retain no more than its 20% commission, leaving petitioner with net earnings of \$2,000. Crediting SOMA with its belated payment of \$277, the amount of \$1,723 remains due and owing to the petitioner.

Labor Code section 1700.25 provides that a licensed talent agency that receives any payment of funds on behalf of an artist shall immediately deposit that amount in a trust fund account maintained by him or her in a bank, and shall disburse those funds, less the agent's commission, to the artist within 30 days after receipt. Section 1700.25 further provides that if, in a hearing before the Labor Commissioner on a petition to determine controversy, the Commissioner finds that the talent agency willfully failed to disburse these amounts within the required time, the Commissioner may award interest on the wrongfully withheld funds at the rate of 10% per annum, and reasonable attorney's fees (if the artist is represented by an attorney).

The term "willful" means that a person has a legal duty to perform an act and intentionally fails to perform that act; evidence of bad faith or intent to defraud is not a prerequisite, and ignorance of the legal duty is not a defense. Hale v. Morgan

(1978) 22 Cal.3d 388, Davis v. Morris (1940) 37 Cal.App.2d 269. Under this standard, we conclude that SOMA's failure to pay petitioner the full \$2,000 owed (consisting of petitioner's gross earnings of \$2,500 less the allowable 20% commission) by April 3, 2003 (that is, within thirty days of Sonic Solutions' payment of \$2,500 to SOMA on March 4, 2003) was "willful" within the meaning of Labor Code section 1700.25, and that petitioner is therefore entitled to interest at the rate of 10% per annum on the unlawfully retained amounts from the date payment was due. ORDER For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent SOMA MANAGEMENT, LLC, shall pay petitioner FANNY GAMBLE, as guardian ad litem for MICHELLE GAMBLE, a minor, a total of \$ 1,897.66, consisting of the following: 1. \$ 1,723.00 for unlawfully withheld earnings; S 174.66 for interest on the unlawfully withheld earnings, as of the date of this decision, with interest accruing at the rate of 47 cents per day until paid. Dated: 4/8/04

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Dated:

MILES E. LOCKER

Attorney for the Labor Commissioner

ADOPTED AS THE DETERMINATION OF THE LABOR COMMISSIONER:

GREGORA L. RUPP

Acting Deputy Chief Labor Commissioner

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